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Abstract
Using daily data on forced migration from the IOM, I compare trends in flows and
mortality across three major migration routes in the Mediterranean, analysing the ef-
fects of the introduction of rescue-deterrence policies in Italy. Controlling for exogenous
shocks which affect push and pull factors in mobility, along with sea state conditions and
route-day fixed effects, I find that the reduction in refugee migration flows in the Central
Mediterranean has been modest, at best. At the same time, these policies have generated
a permanent increase in daily mortality rates in the Central Mediterranean, having grown
by more than 4 deaths per day. Finally, I investigate whether variations in mortality are
sufficient to offset migration flows. Increases in mortality rates, however, are only accom-
panied by a short-term negative displacement effect, as migration attempts are delayed
by increases in absolute mortality, rather than being prevented.
Keywords: costs of migration, forced migration, EU refugee crisis, deterrence policies
JEL codes: F22, J15, J61, J68
1 Introduction
Forced migration flows to EU member states through the Mediterranean Sea reached their
peak in 2015 and have continued to persist in the last several years. Turmoil in the Middle
East and Africa has generated an unprecedented displacement of individuals toward the EU,
many of whom have attempted to reach the shores of Europe by crossing the Mediterranean
sea.
∗The author would like to thank Nicolò Fraccaroli and Anzelika Zaiceva for their invaluable advice and
support. All remaining errors are mine.
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1
This migration route is far from safe, and the death tool has been steadily increasing over
the course of time. Indeed, the evolution of the refugee crisis into a humanitarian disaster
has dominated political discourse and created friction between EU member states. In re-
sponse to the crisis, patrol operations in the Central Mediterranean (such as operations Mare
Nostrum, Triton and Themis) have intensified, but the effort has been far from concerted,
with these operations relying, mostly, on voluntary contributions from EU member states,
and the focus of these operations gradually shifting from search and rescue (S&R, onwards)
to border patrol. Furthermore, uncertainties in the implementation and interpretation of the
Common European Asylum System (Dustmann et al., 2017a), including major weaknesses in
the asylum procedures envisioned under the Dublin regulation, where the duty of examination
of an asylum application falls to the country of first arrival, have only led to further discord
and discontent.
In response to these developments, some private initiatives have arisen and NGOs, such
as Open Arms, Sea-Watch, Mediterranea, Mèdecins Sans Frontières and Save the Children,
amongst many others, have been conducting S&R operations in the Central (and in rarer
instances, Eastern) Mediterranean area.1 These activities have not gone unnoticed.
While some regulation efforts have been made by national authorities, their presence has
been, more or less, tolerated. In Italy, the first of these attempts, the so-called “Minniti
Code” was enacted during the former Gentiloni government in July 2017, and required NGOs
conducting S&R operations in the Central Mediterranean to comply to a code of conduct.
The adoption of said code was not met without opposition from NGOs.2 However, the code
still allowed NGOs to perform their operations, even if within specified boundaries.
This code was not the only measure enacted during the Gentiloni government, as this initi-
ative was accompanied by a much larger change in migrant policy consisting of strengthening
the role of the Libyan coast guard in border patrol operations and in concluding agreements
with Libyan tribal chiefs to break their links with migrant smugglers.3 Critics of this “desert
diplomacy” approach argued that these measures only led to the further exploitation of refugees
and severe violations of human rights.4
In the midst of this debate, non-withstanding the policies of the Gentiloni government, pop-
ulist voices have campaigned in favour of curbing all rescue operations in the Mediterranean,
1European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2019); 2019 update - NGO ships in-
volved in search and rescue in the Mediterranean and criminal investigations; available at:
https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2019/2019-update-ngos-sar-activities; last accessed: August 27th, 2019.
2La Repubblica (2017); Migranti, codice Ong: Msf non firma. Minniti: “Chi non sottoscrive regolamento è
fuori”; available at: https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/07/31/news/migranti_msf_non_firma_codice_ong-
172058967/; last accessed: August 27th, 2019.
3The Guardian (2017); Italian minister defends methods that led to 87% drop in migrants from
Libya; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/07/italian-minister-migrants-libya-marco-minniti; last
accessed: August 28th, 2019
4Politico.eu (2019); Italy’s ‘minister of fear’; https://www.politico.eu/article/marco-minniti-italy-minister-
of-fear/; last accessed: August 28th, 2019.
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arguing that the presence of S&R vessels, even if regulated, encourages migration attempts,
implying that the interruption of these activities would deter migrants from crossing the sea.5
As the hostility of natives towards refugees grew, some of those voices provided an electoral
platform for their sentiments.6 In Italy, the electoral success of the Lega Nord under the new
guise of a "national-populist" party platform, and the nomination of its leader Matteo Salvini
as the Minister of Interior of the M5S-Lega coalition government, has marked the beginning
of a new era in migrant policy for Italy, an era that is in fulfillment of this narrative. The
Twitter hashtag “#Portichiusi” embodied this new stance, which championed, quite literally,
the closure of ports to all vessels carrying rescued migrants.
Indeed, since the appointment of the M5S-Lega government in June 2018, led by prime
minister Giuseppe Conte, the Italian migration policy has been consistently characterised by
a rescue-deterrence stance: S&R activities of NGO vessels operating in the Central Mediter-
ranean have been actively hindered, while the Italian coast guard has also been prevented
from rescuing shipwreck victims outside Italian territorial waters (IOM, 2018). In multiple
occasions, the Ministry of Interior prevented vessels carrying rescued migrants from reaching
Italian shores: these actions went as far as minister Salvini risking his own prosecution for
kidnapping after ordering the Italian Coast Guard ship U. Diciotti not to let rescued refugees
disembark. His prosecution was only deterred by the Parliament voting in favour of his im-
munity from prosecution.7 These deterrence efforts also culminated in two decree laws (known
as Decreto Sicurezza and Decreto Sicurezza bis), enacted in October 4th, 2018 and June 15th,
2019, respectively, which toughened immigration laws, deprived asylum applicants of many
legal guarantees and defacto criminalised migrant rescue operations.
It is still unclear whether the rescue-deterrence policies promoted by the government have
been successful in their aims. Does signalling an abdication of responsibility to rescue stranded
people at sea, increasing the perceived cost of crossing, actually reduces migration flows? And
what is the actual cost of such a policy in terms of human lives being lost? In this paper, I
aim to answer these questions, estimating the impact of deterrence policies such as the one
5As remarked, amongst the others, by declarations of Matteo Salvini – La Repubblica, January 19th,
2019; Centinata annegati senza aiuto, ma per Salvini è colpa delle ong – Luigi Di Maio – Il Fatto Quo-
tidiano, April 23th, 2017; Ong ‘taxi del Mediterraneo’? Di Maio fa insinuazioni senza dare soluzioni;
available at: https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/04/23/ong-taxi-del-mediterraneo-di-maio-fa-insinuazioni-
senza-dare-soluzioni/3538861/; last accessed: August 27th, 2019 – and, over the continent, Nigel Farage – The
Telegraph, September 1st, 2015; Nigel Farage: EU has opened doors to migration exodus of biblical proportions;
available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/nigel-farage/11836131/Nigel-Farage-EU-has-opened-
doors-to-migration-exodus-of-biblical-proportions.html; last accessed: August 27th, 2019.
6While reverse causation between anti-migrant sentiment and the success of these parties cannot be excluded,
evidence from Hangartner et al. (2019) suggests that inflows of refugees can change natives’ attitudes and policy
preferences, exploiting a natural experiment conditioning inflows of refugees to Greek islands. Whether these
changes are further fuelled by preexisting institutional weaknesses leading poor integration of migrants in local
communities and labour markets, is, however, still unclear.
7Reuters (2019); Italian parliament saves Salvini from migrant kidnapping probe; available
at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-politics-salvini/italian-parliament-saves-salvini-from-migrant-
kidnapping-probe-idUSKCN1R11Y4; last accessed: August 28th, 2019.
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promoted in Italy in terms of variations in migration flows and their human costs.
At the same time, the question whether increases in mortality rates alone affect decisions
to migrate remains unanswered, as the introduction of the policy is not sufficient to determine
whether changes in flows can be directly attributed by variations in mortality, or rather by
other factors. There are specific economic assumptions concerning risk-adversity and learning
processes in refugee migration decisions which underlie rescue-deterrence policies. My aim is
to test whether permanent and short-term changes in ‘environmental’ risk factors can affect
(or change) migration decisions in these context.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature on the refugees crisis
and migration decisions under risk; section 3 describes the data sources used in this paper,
while section 4 elaborates and discusses the econometric models used to produce the final
estimates. Then, the following three sections present the main results; showing the impact of
rescue-deterrence on migration flows (section 5) and their effect on mortality rates (section 6),
while estimates for the impact of variations in mortality on migration attempts are contained
in section 7. Finally, section 8 presents the conclusion.
2 Overview of the literature
An influential work from Dustmann et al. (2017a) first focused on the European refugee crisis
from both a policy and labour integration perspective. The authors found that coordination
across the EU has been lacking, and that member states have interpreted their responsibility
within the Geneva Convention for Refugees with much liberty, which also underlines how
asylum applications have been far from equally distributed across countries. Notably, the
study also finds that integration into labour markets has been more difficult for refugees than
for economic migrants. Weaknesses in asylum policies across EU member states, along with
their limited effectiveness in controlling migration flows, were already underlined in Hatton
et al. (2004), who called for more coordination across the EU, and in Facchini et al. (2006),
who argued that these inefficiencies are the systemic product of strategic delegation in this
policy field.
All these studies place emphasis on the distinction between forced migrants (or refugees)
and economic migrants which is, indeed, very important. Economic migrants have long been
studied in the literature and their migration decisions have long been framed within economic
theory.8 Risk can, indeed, act both as a pull and push factor both for economic and forced
migrants.
Forced migration, however, responds to different causes, such as violent conflicts, as studied
in Schmeidl (1997), Vogler and Rotte (2000), Neumayer (2005), and Melander and Öberg
8See Lee (1966), and Borjas (1989)
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(2007), amongst others. Direct changes in exposure to risk factors in the origin country9
can then affect decisions to leave. However, ‘pull’ factors in forced migration, influencing the
decision on which country to migrate to, including how to reach this destination, are much
less unambiguous. Forced migrants are assumed to account for all these risk factors when
considering their expected utility for staying or leaving.
Recent forced migration flows to Europe and their determinants were studied in Brück
et al. (2018), who focused on ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors influencing refugee migration decisions.
In regards to the flows following from the Arab Spring, violence in the origin country and
unemployment in the host country appear as significant predictor of arrivals.
Some attempts have been made to quantify the impact of rescue-deterrence policies in
Italy and their influence as (negative) pull factors. In this regard, the work from Villa10 is
certainly worth mentioning. This work similarly focuses on the effect of “desert diplomacy”
and “#Portichiusi” policies on migration flows, estimating a monthly reduction of 12,119 (SE:
2,417; ≈408 daily) and 6,539 (SE: 2,717; ≈220 daily) arrivals by the Sea, respectively.11 Most
notably, no significant effect from the presence of NGOs S&R vessels is found. Descriptive
evidence in the relationship between official search and rescue operations and mortality was
also provided in Deschenes and Moretti (2009).
I expand on this work by providing a more robust analysis of mortality and migration flows,
using high frequency data and controlling for exogenous time-dependent migration shocks by
adopting a comparative approach with other migration routes. In any case, the value of the
present work resides beyond the analysis of flow-deterrence as this is, to the best of the author’s
knowledge, the first attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of these policies
on mortality rates, and on the impact of mortality on short-term decisions to migrate, with a
focus on reverse causality issues.
It is straightforward that rescue-deterrence policies comply to an underlying economic ra-
tionale: individual costs of migration are increased as agents update their information on the
perceived riskiness of a migration attempt. For a deterrence policy to be successful, this per-
ception can be modified either directly, through factual increases in mortality (an "extensive"
margin), or indirectly, through updates in expectations generated by the announcement of the
policy itself (the "intensive" margin).
Previously cited literature focused precisely on this mechanism, where variations in mi-
gration flows are attributed to environmental changes in risk. The perception of risk among
migrants and refugees, however, might diverge significantly from the general population. The
literature on migration choice is not unfamiliar to risk attitudes, and can instruct the design
9See also Rodriguez and Villa (2012) for how displacement responds to changes in kidnapping risk, and
Deschenes and Moretti (2009) for changes in mortality.
10Il Post (2019); Chi porta davvero i migranti in Italia; available at: https://www.ilpost.it/2019/07/08/ong-




The relatively lower risk-aversion of migrants is documented by a number of studies. Look-
ing at economic migrants, Jaeger et al. (2010) first found that lower risk-aversity makes indi-
viduals more likely to migrate. These findings were later reconfirmed, in a different context,
by Dustmann et al. (2017b).
Risk attitudes were first studied in the context of the EU refugee crisis in Bocquého et al.
(2018), which studied the risk preferences of refugees in an experimental setting, and framed
the results within cumulative prospect theory. The authors conclude that forced migrants
are characterised by low loss aversion and a preference for gains, implying that deterrence
measures might be less effective on this population.
This literature is valuable to us, but does not provide much insight into the possibility of
changes in risk aversion. Under this line of thought, flows might change due to increases in
mortality, in accordance with individual risk aversions, which would remain the same. An-
other strand of literature, instead, investigated whether external events might affect individual
preferences for risk. In the context of our research question, these studies might suggest that
increases in the mortality rates of the Mediterranean could also generate permanent changes
in migration behaviours.
A paper from Callen et al. (2014) focused on direct exposure to violence and changes in
risk attitudes, arguing that traumatic experiences lead to individuals developing a preference
for certainty. However, these results were reassessed and criticized by Vieider (2018), while
Akgüç et al. (2016) also provided evidence that individual risk attitudes are unaffected by
substantial changes in the environment.
3 Data
I use data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Frontex, integrating
these sources with data from Eurostat, the Italian Air Force (ITAF – Aeronautica Militare, in
Italian), the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and information on
NGOs S&R vessels activity from a number of news sources.
The IOM reports and disseminates data on both migration flows12 and missing migrants13
in the Mediterranean Sea.
IOM data on registered arrivals is collected ‘through consultations with the ministry of the
interior, coast guards, police forces and other relevant national authorities IOM (2018). This
data includes arrivals both by land and by sea, and is reported for all major countries of first
arrival in Europe.




routes in the Mediterranean: namely, Western (possible destination: Spain), Central (Italy
or Malta) and Eastern (Greece and, more rarely, Cyprus). This data is collected from mul-
tiple sources, which are detailed in the data-set: these could be, for example, government
authorities, the press, alarm phones or search and rescue vessels. The estimated date of the
accident is also based on these sources, which are classified by their quality: therefore, I drop
all observations on incidents based on information from only one media source (level 1), so as
to minimise measurement error.14
Both figures on arrivals and missing migrants are generally reported daily, with a few
relevant exceptions. While for Italy, Malta, Greece and Cyprus daily flows by sea have been
available since 2014, Spanish authorities have only began to do so recently, as accesses have
reported monthly up until the end of 2017. Daily arrivals to Spain for 2017 are then imputed
by dividing total monthly flows across each day in a month.
Frontex also supplies monthly information on the origin of migrants crossing the sea.15
I have used these figures to reconstruct the nationality of migrants attempting to cross the
Mediterranean. Monthly unemployment figures from Eurostat for Spain, Italy and Greece
were also collected, so that they can be used as ‘pull’ factor controls in our econometric
model, following from the findings of Brück et al. (2018).
The Italian Air Force releases its Meteomar bulletin every six hours, announcing forecasts
and present conditions for the sea state in the Mediterranean. The bulletin offers notices and
forecasts for 22 areas in the Mediterranean. Comparing information on migration routes from
the IOM and the coordinates from these areas, I match three "seas" where most migration
attempts occur: the Libyan sea for the Central Mediterranean Route, the Alboran sea for the
Western Route, and the Aegean sea for the Eastern Route. Running a simple text mining
technique, I then reconstruct daily sea state conditions for each of the three routes, generating
indicators for occurrences (and their forecasts) of seastorms (meaning a >= 7 score on the
Douglas scale) and thunderstorms.
Information on political instability at exit points is obtained through Raleigh et al. (2010).
I proxy political instability through the daily number of fatal accidents linked to violent
political unrest registered in the largest exit point countries (Libya and Tunisia for the Central
Mediterranean route, Morocco and Algeria for the Western Mediterranean, Turkey for the
Eastern Mediterranean). Instability in origin countries is, instead, not relevant to this analysis,
as I study variations in flows comparatively across routes, meaning that these shocks are
absorbed by design once controlling for shocks affecting a single route.
An overview of non-governmental S&R operations is provided by the European Union
Agency for Fundamental Rights.16 Using this information, I reconstruct the time-frame of





activities for each NGO vessel, and create an indicator for the number of active private S&R
vessels on each day for every given route.
Finally, I harmonise and aggregate this information to construct a final dataset, which
includes daily information from January 2017 to March 2019. As, starting from July 2017, the
introduction of the “desert diplomacy” policy in the Central Mediterranean route significantly
affected the number of accesses, the empirical model will also allow for the introduction of
multiple policies.
All flows to the five Mediterranean states are aggregated into the three main routes, for
911 days. This simplification is motivated by two distinct necessities: firstly, this is the only
way to reduce all data sources to a common number of dimensions and, secondly, the final
destination of missing migrants can never be fully ascertained. Nevertheless, the absence of
significant unilateral changes in migration policies in Malta (meaning that flows to Malta will
be as well affected by policy changes in Italy), along with the negligible volume of migrants
who eventually land on this island, allows the aggregation of all flows into the three distinct
routes without compromising the estimates.
4 Empirical Model
As a model for migration flows, I propose the following specification, using a group-level
difference in difference estimator:
Attemptsrt = β0 + Policy
′











β8 + γr + δt + εrt (1)
where β0 is a constant and Policy is a vector of migration policies (Policy1rt, Policy2rt, ...,
PolicyPrt) at time t in each migration route r, which can either be western, central, or eastern
Mediterranean. The outcome variable Attemptsrt indicates the number of daily migration
attempts – that is, the sum of deaths and successful arrivals by sea. As it takes less than a
day to reach Italy from Libya,17 I assume that missing or dead individuals would have reached
their destination on the same day of their disappearance, if they survived. V esselsrt, instead,
captures the number of active search and rescue vessels operated by NGOs, while Deaths is a
vector of lags and moving averages for reported dead or missing migrants.
Route specific variation in sea conditions is captured by the Seastate vector, including
lagged values for sea state conditions in each route, while γr and δt are, respectively, fixed
effect specific to the migration route, week and month. This specification essentially establishes
17The Economist (2015); Everything you want to know about migration across the Mediterranean;
available at: https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2015/04/21/everything-you-want-to-know-
about-migration-across-the-mediterranean; last accessed: September 2nd, 2019
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a group-level difference-in-differences setting, where daily fixed effects are captured by the δt
term, while γr covers the baseline effect of each migration route. As the Policy vector already
captures the interaction between time and the ‘treated’ route, the coefficients contained in β1
will yield the impact of each policy on the dependent variable.
Finally, Unrest specifies lags and moving averages for political unrest in the exit regions,
while PushShocks and PullShocks are vectors of push and pull factors affecting the relative
supply of migrants in a given route, in a given day. These factors should include those eco-
nomic, cultural and geographic determinants which might affect the number of attempts in a
given route and which are not already captured by route and time fixed affects.
PullShocks includes lagged values for the monthly level of unemployment in the main
destination of each of the three routes – so either Spain, Italy or Greece.
Given that modelling socio-economic shocks from each country of origin would generate an
excessive loss of degrees of freedom, possibly leading to over-specification bias, PushShocks
controls for exogenous shocks specific to populations which only cross a single route. This
term is obtained by first identifying, for each route, the monthly share of the nationalities
which, during the full study window, have attempted crossing on this specific route.
This monthly ratio is then multiplied by the daily attempts, and then de-trended, to
obtain an approximation of the daily variation in migrants whose preference for a single route
is infinitely elastic with regards to the pull-factors conditioning access through the other routes.
In other words, this term controls for variations in route-specific push-factors, which might
pose as a source of bias for total amount of accesses which cannot already be controlled by
the fixed effects terms in the model. While I could still assume route-specific migration shocks
to be random and uncorrelated with the policy adoption, the very small number of groups in
my analysis (n = 3) still requires shocks to be shared across the three routes for them not to
affect the results.
The model proposed in equation (1) is then re-adapted to study daily mortality in each
route, as in equation (2):
Deathsrt = β0 + Policy
′









β8 + γr + δt + εrt (2)
where Deathsrt indicates the daily number of dead or missing migrants per route, while the
fourth term in the right side of the equation refers to migration attempts in the same day.
Compared to equation (1), this term is not a vector of lags and moving averages, but refers to
the number of migration attempts on the same day.
Indeed, I assume that daily attempts might be affected by previous variations in mortality
because of changes in the perceived risk of migration, but daily fatal accidents on the sea would
be solely dependent on the number of attempts on the same day, as I assume the mortality
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rate Deathsrt/Attemptsrt to be exogenous to the number of attempts.18
Models (1) and (2) are more than sufficient for testing the impact of rescue-deterrence
policies in terms of flow reduction and mortality. In these cases, potential reverse causality
issues between flows and mortality are tempered by the assumption that these policies generate
a permanent and exogenous change in perceived mortality rates.
I am, however, also interested in whether mortality itself affects flows as a deterrent,
independently from policy actions. However, estimating the effect of variations of perceived
mortality in the sea over migration attempts is a much more complicated issue.
First of all, how actors update their information on mortality should be discussed. A
perfectly informed and rational actor would update his/her information on migration risk
using the expectation E[Deathsrt/Attemptsrt] for the mortality coefficient. These expectation
could be based on previous values for this coefficient, such as Deathsrt−1/Attemptsrt−1 or a
ratio of moving averages.
But do individuals really account for the denominator in this coefficient? Increases in
absolute mortality in the sea might be caused by increases in flows, with relative mortality
remaining fixed; but it seems difficult to believe that individuals would prioritize relative over
absolute information on mortality.
The behavioural literature has presented evidence in support of this assumption. Availab-
ility heuristics (as first studied in Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) have been shown to influence
individual expectations on the likelihood of an event based on ‘the ease with which instances or
occurrences can be brought to mind.’ These heuristics can lead to biases where other relevant
information is not as easily available. Large tragedies in the Mediterranean sea usually receive
large media coverage and, due to their salience, tragic events might also be easier to recall. In
contrast, information on flows might not be as easily available, or flows could be mistakenly
held as fixed. This could lead to biases in decision making, where individuals would value
absolute over relative mortality.
Also, even if the denominator were known, it is unlikely that individuals are immediately
exposed to the mortality ratio, rather than having to compute that for themselves from ab-
solute figures. Indeed, studies in affect heuristics (see Slovic et al., 2000) have shown how
perceived risk is greater when information is updated through frequency-based scales rather
than communicated through probabilities.
It follows that, in order to measure the effect of increases in mortality and its effects on
the perceived risk of migration, absolute increases in mortality should be used as explanatory
variables, rather than changes in relative mortality.
As discussed, the mortality rate is exogenous to attempts but perceived mortality – if
informed by the aforementioned processes – is not, as total deaths are a function of attempts.
18Also, on a slightly more technical note, as the IOM already adjusts the date of fatal accidents to the most
plausible day, there is no need to lag the co-variate group to account for delays in the reporting of deaths.
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If individuals do not take into account the total number of attempts, and if perceived mortality
is only affected by deaths, then perceived mortality is not exogenous, and the effects of reported
deaths on attempts will be upwardly biased.
Removing this bias is then paramount. Further, lagging deaths is not a sufficient solution
to the problem. As discussed in Bellemare et al. (2017), the use of lagged explanatory variables
cannot appease endogeneity concerns when there are reasons to believe lagged values are still
suffering from endogeneity. In this case, a different empirical strategy is needed.
For increases in absolute mortality to be really exogenous, these increases should be as-
signed independently from migration flows. The solution to this problem will come from
an instrumental variable approach and, more precisely, by exploiting the random variation
generated by relative mortality itself.
Indeed, as discussed earlier, and as will later be demonstrated, relative mortality is exo-
genous to the number of migration attempts, while still retaining relevant predictive power
on absolute mortality. This means that instrumenting absolute mortality through its relat-
ive component will yield an unbiased estimate for the effect of each additional death in the
Mediterranean on migration attempts. Filtered by this instrument, reported deaths become
as good as random, as increases in absolute mortality are randomised through increases in
relative mortality, controlling, in this way, for the stocks of flows already affecting the total
number of dead or missing.
This being considered, the resulting first stage regressions will be:
Deaths
′
= β0 + Policy
′











β8 + γr + δt + εrt (3)
where Deaths andMortality are vectors of lags and moving averages for absolute and relative
mortality. Model (3), indeed, implies as many first stages as the number of lags in the model.
For clarity purposes, I will use a one-day lag and a varying moving average for the past days,
but more combinations are certainly possible.
Finally, these values from model (3) are plugged in the second stage equation (4):
Attemptsrt = β0 + Policy
′








β8 + γr + δt + εrt (4)
where ̂Deaths is a vector of predicted values from the first stages in equation (3).
Finally, the nature of the model and data used requires a few words to be spent on the
correct calculation of standard errors.
In panel difference-in-difference designs, it is often suggested that standard errors should
be clustered by group and time. However, in instances, such as ours, when data is already
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Figure 1: Cumulative migration attempts in the Mediterranean
aggregated at the group level, clustering standard errors by group and time is not any different
from not clustering at all (Cameron and Miller, 2015). In these cases, it is suggested to
simply cluster by group, and leave the time dimension unclustered (Cameron and Miller,
2015; Bertrand et al., 2004).
Collapsing individual data on the group level of aggregation in order to obtain more con-
sistent standard errors is, after all, already a standard practice in the applied literature (see
Bertrand et al., 2004).
However, in panels with small n and large t, we also need to account for serial correla-
tion and time-wise heteroscedasticity. In these instances, an asymptotically efficient Panel
Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) estimator, as proposed by Beck and Katz (1995), is often
considered appropriate. The estimator assumes disturbances to be serially correlated and het-
eroskedastic, and will then be used to produce robust standard errors for the remainder of the
paper.
5 Deterrence and migration flows
Cumulative migration flows across the three routes, starting from January 2017, are plotted
in figure 1.
While, naturally, the figure only focuses on the time-driven variation in flows, omitting
the influence of other important predictors, preliminary visual evidence already suggests that
the most significant impact on migration flows is linked with the introduction of the “desert
diplomacy” approach under the Gentiloni government. Comparing trends in the Central Medi-
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Figure 2: Cumulative migration attempts in the Mediterranean (A ∩B ∩ C set)
terranean with the other routes, parallel trends in growth between the three routes have been
disrupted by the introduction of the policy, after which the slope of the Central Mediterranean
route has changed.
Rescue-deterrence policies (#Portichiusi) enacted during the Conte government, instead,
do not seem to have had a great impact on flow reduction: indeed, since the introduction
of Minniti’s policies (“desert diplomacy”), cumulative attempts in the Central Mediterranean
have grown linearly, suggesting that no significant change in trends has occurred. However,
while trends in growth between the Central and Eastern Mediterranean have remained parallel,
the Western route has witnessed a peculiar increase in accesses, suggesting that a relocation
effect might have taken place.
Results from figure 1 might, however, be misleading: shocks unique to a specific route
might lead to a bias in our estimates, especially if we suspect the presence of route-specific
and time-dependent migration shocks from specific countries. In these cases, the only solution
is to suppress the ‘unique’ components from flows, filtering out all entries from countries of
origin where migrants do not have access to all three routes.
More formally, suppose that there are three sets of nationalities A, B and C. Nationalities
in A have had at least one migrant attempting to cross, say, the Western Mediterranean route
across the estimation window, and the same goes for the other sets and routes. Focusing on
the A∩B ∩C subset enables us to focus only on those migrants who had the option to choose
between the three routes, controlling for route-specific shocks.
I do so in figure 2, by obtaining the monthly proportion of shared flows from Frontex data
srt, and applying this ratio to the daily number of arrivals. This method is valid as long as we
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assume that the daily nationality composition to reflect monthly figures, a decently reasonable
simplification.
After adjusting flow figures for this component, previous trends appear to persist, including
the relocation effect, which even experiences a higher relative increase.
Regression results are plotted in table 1. Column (1) estimates the baseline effect of the
two policies, omitting all controls except for day and route fixed effects. I find a statistic-
ally significant reduction of 392 migrants per day after the introduction of Minniti’s policies,
and a statistically significant -122 reduction for Salvini’s policies. Other regressors are then
reintroduced in the next specification, until the full model is presented in column (5).
Column (2) introduces controls for absolute mortality – including a one-day lag and a
moving average for the previous two weeks – and for the number of S&R vessels operating in
the sea. Relative mortality controls are, instead, shown in the appendix. The policy coefficients
are not particularly affected, and, as the next specification will confirm, it is worth considering
that the presence of vessels does not appear to be connected to increases in migration activity,
in contrast with the accusations that their presence has acted as a positive pull factor to refugee
migration. The interpretation of the mortality coefficients is, instead, less straightforward, as
these estimates for mortality are not robust to reverse causality: hence the positive coefficient
for both regressors.19
Columns (3) and (4) introduce controls for sea state conditions, political instability at
exit points and unemployment in the first arrival country. Weather conditions appear as a
significant deterrent for migration behaviour, increasing the precision of the model.
Column (5) completes the model, adding controls for route-specific migration shocks. These
controls reduce the effect of both the #Portichiusi (moving to -131.227, SE: 59.785) and desert
diplomacy policy (-369.846, SE: 6.887). Other regressors retrieve their signs and magnitudes,
with a few exceptions; notably, the 14 days moving average for political instability at exit point
now becomes a statistically significant predictor of migration attempts. Column (7) retrieves
the same specification, but changes the dependent variable so that only the A∩B ∩C subset
is represented, as done for figure 2. The policy coefficients maintain a comparable magnitude.
Finally, as I suspect relocation effects to the Spanish route, in column (6) I add dummies
for policy spill-over effects in the other routes, using the Eastern Mediterranean route as a
baseline, to the specification from column (5). I repeat the same exercise in column (8), using
the model from column (7).
These results suggest that, undoubtedly, a dislocation effect has been generated. However,
given the limitations of the data at hand, it is not currently possible to find which of the two
policies ultimately caused the dislocation effect in 2018. At best, the rescue-deterrence policies
have generated a ≈157 individuals reduction in daily flows, at worse, this reduction is of only
≈46 refugees per day – and barely significant from a statistical standpoint as well.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Cumulative reported dead-or-missing in the Mediterranean
Until further evidence is available, discerning whether rescue-deterrence policies in the
Central Mediterranean have had an immediate (as exemplified in figures 1 and 2) effect on
migration flows towards Spain, or whether the relocation effect has been generated by previous
“desert diplomacy” attempts, disrupting migration routes to the coast from within Libya, is
left to the judgement of the reader.
In any case, it is evident – both from visual evidence and from coefficient analysis –
that total flows in the Mediterranean have not changed much since the introduction of the
policy, even if countries like Italy or Malta were comparatively less affected. Holding the
Eastern Mediterranean route as the baseline, differences in the rescue-deterrence coefficients
from column (6) point at an increase in 35.431 migrants per day across the Western and Central
routes, with a 24.873 standard error: after the introduction of rescue deterrence policies, total
refugee migration flows have barely changed at all.
6 Deterrence and human costs
Trends in absolute mortality in the Mediterranean are reported in figure 3 where, again,
cumulative sums for each of the three routes are plotted, starting from January 2017. As
mentioned earlier, I also filter by source using the quality criteria set by the IOM, so that only
reported deaths than can be fully attributed to migration attempts are estimated. The true
mortality rate could then, be, understated.
On the one hand, the figure suggests that trends in mortality have followed a linear path
over the entire estimation window in both the Eastern and Western Mediterranean routes.
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Figure 4: Cumulative dead-or-missing over cumulative arrivals in the Mediterranean
On the other hand, the Central Mediterranean route has experienced two discontinuities in
regard to the occasion of the introduction of the two policies. Indeed, since the introduction of
“desert diplomacy”, mortality in the sea has seen a significant reduction,20 while “#Portichiusi”
rescue-deterrence policies seems to have generated an opposite effect, increasing mortality by
a significant margin.
What is disconcerting, at least from this initial visual evidence, is that, after the intro-
duction of rescue-deterrence policies, trends in absolute mortality in the Eastern and Western
routes have been proportional to the flows in migration while, in the Central route, mortality
has increased, even if migration flows, as seen earlier, have diminished.
Figure 4 provides some further checks to these findings, showing changes in the ratio
between cumulative dead-or-missing accidents and cumulative migration attempts in the Medi-
terranean.21 As the ratio in the Central route increases after the introduction of rescue-
deterrence policies, the previous interpretation remains fundamentally unchanged.
Table 2 presents regression output for the effect of deterrence policy on absolute mortality.
As migration attempts, being included among the covariates, are already controlled for in
the model, there is no reason to worry about the relocation effect which affected previous
estimates.
Column (1) introduces a basic specification including the policy vector and migration
attempts as controls. These first results might falsely suggest that rescue-deterrence policies
have had no effect on mortality rates. Further controls are introduced until the full model is
20Increases in mortality on land are not to be excluded, but their study goes beyond the aims of this research.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































achieved in column (5). Column (2) introduces the number of active NGO S&R vessels as a
control, overturning previous results, and suggesting that reverse correlation affected estimates
from column (1): this time, the effect of “desert diplomacy” appears not statistically different
from zero, while an increase in 4.426 deaths per day is revealed after the appointment of
Giuseppe Conte’s government. It is important to note that the presence of S&R vessels is
not exogenous to the number of deaths, as these vessels are already operated in response to
increases in total mortality in the Mediterranean: the estimate for the vessels coefficient is,
then, not robust to reverse causality.
Column (3) adds controls for the sea state, while column (4) adds further push and pull
factor controls. Column (5) controls for migration shock. In conformity with the estimates
from table 1, sea state controls suggest a negative effect of adverse conditions (one day earlier)
on mortality, given the reduction of migration attempts. The other controls add more noise
to the model, as expected, with the adjusted r-squared being reduced from their inclusion.
The coefficient for the policy vector confirm a 4.444 increase in absolute mortality caused by
the introduction of rescue-deterrence policies, while the previous policy attempt still does not
reach the 5% significance level.
As discussed earlier, data on missing migrants in the Mediterranean is collected from
multiple sources. Since some of these sources are, indeed, rescue vessels, the reduction of
search and rescue activities in the Mediterranean route caused by the deterrence policy itself
might stand as a potential source of bias. Indeed, it is straightforward that, for each additional
NGO ship involved in search and rescue ceasing operations, the probability of deaths in the
sea being reported by one of these vessel lowers considerably.
This could pose as a significant source of downward bias, as the number of S&R vessels is
correlated with the introduction of the policy, meaning that our estimates will underestimate
the effect of the deterrence policy in terms of mortality rates.
These hurdles, however, can be easily overcome. Indeed, I discussed how IOM missing
migrants data details the original source of information for each record. In this way, I were able
to filter out all casualties reported by S&R vessels, producing an alternate variable Deaths∗tr
where the post-policy variation in deaths is not caused by the reduction of operational S&R
vessels. While total mortality will still be lower, differential rates in mortality before and after
the introduction of the policy should not be biased by the introduction of the policy.
Figures for the effect of the effect of deterrence policies on Deaths∗tr are presented in
column (6). Interestingly, the difference in the policy coefficients between columns (5) and
(6) is positive, suggesting that S&R vessels still play an important role in reporting dead or
missing individuals, and that most bias concerns can be disregarded.
Finally, a new specification is presented in column (7), this time using relative mortality
(Deathstr/Attemptstr) as the dependent variable. Estimates reveal a change in the relative
mortality of 0.075% and -0.055% for the policies of Salvini and Minniti, respectively. Also,
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the magnitude of the attempts coefficients is so small it can effectively be argued that the
mortality rate is independent from attempts, as I discussed earlier. Reverse causality concerns
for the effect of vessels presence on mortality rates persist.
7 Deterrence of mortality
I now turn to the final question addressed in this paper. Previous results did not provide
any evidence on the channel through which rescue-deterrence can affect migratory patterns.
Given that rescue-deterrence implies an increase in the risk of crossing the sea as a deterrent to
migration, it should be questioned how changes in mortality can affect decisions to interrupt
ongoing migration attempts.
This question is addressed in table 3, where instrumental variable estimates for the effect of
absolute mortality on migration attempts are shown. As discussed in section 4, daily reported
deaths – the endogenous variable – are instrumented through relative mortality, referring to
ratio between deaths and migration. Reduced form estimates showing the direct effect of
relative mortality on migration attempts are shown in table 4 in the appendix.
The models from table 3 retain the same co-variates from table 1, column (6), with only
the endogenous variable vector Deaths being replaced. Column (1) contains a single one-day
lag in said vector. Columns (2) to (4) switch the endogenous variables vector between pairings
of one-day lags and varying moving averages for the days preceding t – moving from 3, to 7 and
finally 14 days before each attempt. In all cases, all first stage specifications successfully pass
the F-tests for excluded instruments, suggesting that relative mortality is indeed a relevant
predictor for absolute mortality.
Looking at the main estimates for the effect of mortality, results are now overturned,
evidencing that endogeneity concerns for absolute mortality were, indeed, valid. The effect
of increases in mortality one day before the migration attempt is turned negative, ranging
between a 1.450 and 2.141 reduction in migrants attempting crossing per day. Most import-
antly, analysis of the moving averages coefficients reveals this to reduction to be explained as
temporary near-term displacement. Indeed, no effect is detected within the 3 days window,
and the reduction of migration attempts is completely re-absorbed after 7 days, suggesting
that refugees do not reverse their migration decision as a consequence of increases in the risk
of crossing, but only postpone their departure by a few days.
While these results are only valid for the first 14 days, and are supposed to affect migration
decisions already taken (and not initial migration decisions), the fact that the “#Portichiusi”
policy coefficient loses all its statistical significance indicates that its remaining components,
including, as found earlier, the permanent increase in mortality, are also ineffective in reducing
migration flows.
The insignificance of the policy coefficient in Italy indicates that the remaining variation
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Table 3: Effect of mortality on migration attempts
Daily migration attempts
Total Attempts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
#Portichiusi −20.367 −19.416 −37.940 −42.662
(23.313) (22.361) (32.151) (28.823)
#Portichiusi (W. Route) 107.224∗∗∗ 107.698∗∗∗ 101.186∗∗∗ 98.499∗∗∗
(11.356) (11.335) (12.131) (11.107)
Desert diplomacy −390.612∗∗∗ −392.273∗∗∗ −376.570∗∗∗ −373.058∗∗∗
(16.579) (18.669) (13.576) (15.993)
Desert diplomacy (W. Route) −2.954 −2.528 −8.196 −11.520
(10.381) (10.387) (11.227) (10.364)
No of S&R Vessels 7.422 7.655 3.871 3.095
(5.336) (5.197) (6.764) (6.065)
Reported Deaths (lag 1) −1.450∗∗∗ −1.268∗∗∗ −2.141∗∗∗ −2.032∗∗∗
(0.371) (0.300) (0.515) (0.410)
Reported Deaths (MA3) −0.522
(1.135)
Reported Deaths (MA7) 4.244∗∗
(1.837)
Reported Deaths (MA14) 5.042∗∗∗
(0.774)
Wind Storm 00h00 −33.256∗∗∗ −33.133∗∗∗ −34.315∗∗∗ −34.234∗∗∗
(7.442) (7.445) (7.301) (7.080)
Wind Storm (lag 1) −21.415 −21.264 −22.844 −22.567
(15.491) (15.530) (15.252) (15.337)
Thunder Storm 00h00 −22.452 −22.743 −19.647 −20.208
(19.455) (19.637) (18.852) (18.235)
Thunder Storm (lag 1) −22.961∗ −23.069∗ −19.947∗ −20.536∗
(12.870) (12.810) (11.714) (11.441)
Instability at exit point (lag 1) −8.814 −8.919 −8.309 −9.111
(8.610) (8.676) (8.010) (8.523)
Instability at exit point (MA14) −36.499∗∗∗ −36.655∗∗∗ −33.719∗∗∗ −30.299∗∗∗
(4.905) (5.158) (2.893) (3.712)
Youth unemp. in host country (log, lag 5 months) 333.480 336.601 298.914 268.669
(363.611) (365.567) (350.728) (329.016)
Country of origin controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Route fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
Time fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
Adjusted R2 0.172 0.169 0.168 0.169
First Stage (1): Adj. R2 0.141 0.142 0.144 0.152
First Stage (1): F Test 81.385 86.595 90.746 1925.109
First Stage (2): Adj. R2 0.205 0.338 0.581
First Stage (2): F Test 203.446 287.186 260.202
Observations 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Beck and Katz (1995) Panel Corrected SEs, clustered by route.
(1) First stage for endogenous variable: Reported Deaths (lag 1)
(2) First stage for endogenous variable: Reported Deaths (MA3-14)
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in flows linked with the policy introduction is mostly driven by random shocks, and that the
only significant reduction in flows is to be attributed to relocation effects, which might have
been, in turn, generated by the previous “desert diplomacy” approach.
Overall, these results reinforce the view that forced migration is qualitatively different from
economic migration, supporting of previous findings in the literature suggesting that forced
migrants are characterised by extremely low levels of risk-aversion.
8 Conclusions
It is widely considered that coordination in refugee migration policies and asylum procedures in
the EU has been lacking, leaving the EU destination countries to deal with the crisis by them-
selves. Persistence of flows, dissatisfaction with the EU framework and political opportunism
from national-populist forces have led to an unprecedented strengthening of anti-migrant sen-
timent in the countries involved. In Italy, the appointment of a new government in June 2018
heralded the beginning of a novel rescue-deterrence stance in migration, which set to reduce
migration flows by effectively making the crossing of the Mediterranean riskier.
Based on high-frequency data on migration flows and migrant disappearances in the Medi-
terranean across three major migration routes, I provide empirical evidence on the effect of
rescue-deterrence policies on both flows and mortality rates, and investigate the effect of in-
creases in absolute mortality on decisions to continue ongoing migration attempts.
I find that both absolute and relative mortality in the route towards Italy and Malta have
increased by at least 4 deaths per day since the introduction of the policy, and that this
increase in mortality has been accompanied by a very modest reduction in flows. Finally, this
work shows that forced migration flows do respond to short-term changes in mortality, but
that this effect is only temporary, as migration attempts are delayed and reabsorbed within
few weeks. Notably, there is also evidence to suggest that permanent increases in mortality are
also ineffective. These findings suggest that risk aversion among refugees might be particularly
low.
In the view of the author, the evidence uncovered by this paper provides a strong point in
support of the repeal – or a large revision – of rescue-deterrence practices in migration policy.
Signalling the abdication of a responsibility to rescue refugees in distress, while hindering
the humanitarian initiatives engaged in search and rescue operation, is not only relatively
ineffective as a strategy for flow disruption, but most importantly carries an unacceptable cost
in terms of human lives.
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A Appendix
Table 4: Reduced form effect of relative mortality on migration attempts
Daily migration attempts
Total Attempts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
#Portichiusi −23.522 −23.238 −25.124 −31.007
(22.498) (22.275) (23.631) (25.142)
#Portichiusi (W. Route) 105.398∗∗∗ 105.406∗∗∗ 105.627∗∗∗ 105.844∗∗∗
(11.137) (11.089) (11.181) (11.364)
Desert diplomacy −385.188∗∗∗ −385.144∗∗∗ −385.853∗∗∗ −386.332∗∗∗
(16.802) (16.727) (17.297) (17.899)
Desert diplomacy (W. Route) −3.731 −3.553 −4.323 −5.444
(10.651) (10.627) (10.602) (10.860)
No of S&R Vessels 6.556 6.566 6.549 6.260
(5.122) (5.104) (5.181) (5.405)
Relative Mortality (lag 1) −30.667∗∗∗ −27.508∗∗∗ −33.265∗∗∗ −35.643∗∗∗
(5.872) (5.034) (5.654) (5.724)
Relative Mortality (MA3) −9.401
(9.331)
Relative Mortality (MA7) 30.886∗
(17.516)
Relative Mortality (MA14) 117.955∗∗∗
(25.021)
Wind Storm 00h00 −34.068∗∗∗ −33.955∗∗∗ −34.100∗∗∗ −34.148∗∗∗
(7.341) (7.232) (7.304) (7.138)
Wind Storm (lag 1) −20.498 −20.452 −20.816 −20.559
(14.965) (14.913) (15.101) (14.796)
Thunder Storm 00h00 −20.730 −20.557 −20.680 −20.929
(20.270) (20.265) (20.162) (20.108)
Thunder Storm (lag 1) −22.297∗ −22.104∗ −22.864∗ −22.951∗
(12.017) (11.990) (12.249) (12.048)
Instability at exit point (lag 1) −8.578 −8.558 −8.668 −8.692
(8.792) (8.783) (8.871) (8.823)
Instability at exit point (MA14) −34.886∗∗∗ −34.703∗∗∗ −35.380∗∗∗ −35.390∗∗∗
(4.021) (4.020) (4.352) (4.377)
Youth unemp. in host country (log, lag 5 months) 313.451 313.874 310.137 310.875
(358.085) (357.342) (359.457) (360.388)
Country of origin controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Route fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
Time fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
R2 0.466 0.466 0.466 0.466
Adjusted R2 0.191 0.191 0.191 0.191
Observations 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Beck and Katz (1995) Panel Corrected SEs, clustered by route.
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